SARAH L. OVERTON (CSB # 163810) 1 CUMMINGS, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates, P.C. 2 3801 University Avenue, Suite 560 Riverside, CA 92501 3 AUG 16 2019 (951) 276-4420 (951) 276-4405 facsimile 4 of the Superior Contr Attorneys for the Honorable V. Raymond Swope, 5 Judge of the Superior Court of California. DEPUTY CLERK County of San Mateo 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 9 **CASE NO: CIV533328** SIX4THREE, LLC, 10 11 Plaintiff, VERIFIED ANSWER OF JUDGE V. RAYMOND SWOPE 12 v. TO STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 13 **AUTHORITIES** FACEBOOK, INC., et al., 14 CIV533328 Defendants. NOT 15 Notice 16 17 18 The Honorable V. Raymond Swope, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of 19 San Mateo, hereby responds to the statement of disqualification filed by plaintiff in the instant 20 matter. 21 VERIFIED ANSWER OF JUDGE V. RAYMOND SWOPE 22 I, V. Raymond Swope, do declare as follows: 23 1. I am a Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, and have 24 been assigned to preside over this case. If called upon as a witness, I could and would competently 25 testify to the matters as stated herein. 26 2. On October 25, 2016, the court signed a stipulated protective order in this case. On 27 November 1, 2018, the court granted a motion to seal certain confidential documents, and further 28 ordered stricken certain evidence proffered by plaintiff in its filing. Then, on November 19, 2018,

VERIFIED ANSWER OF THE HONORABLE V. RAYMOND SWOPE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

the court was notified by defendant Facebook, Inc., that un-redacted copies of documents were released in violation of the court's prior protective order. On November 20, 2018, the court issued a further order that no un-redacted copy of plaintiff's opposition to either Facebook's special motion to strike or individual defendants' special motion to strike could be transmitted, released or submitted until further order of the court. Finally, the court stated that a failure to comply with the court's order would be considered an act of contempt.

- 3. Thereafter, on November 26, 2018, defendant Facebook, Inc. filed an ex parte application for an order to show cause regarding plaintiff's contempt of the court's orders. Since the date of that ex parte filing, there have been numerous pleadings and declarations filed by both plaintiff and defendant regarding their respective positions. In addition, there have been numerous hearings concerning the order to show cause at which the court issued further orders directed to the parties.
- 4. On July 2, 2019, Matthew J. Olson and the law firm of Macdonald/Fernandez filed a notice of limited scope representation of plaintiff, after plaintiff's prior counsel withdrew. Plaintiff then filed its first statement of disqualification on July 12, 2019. That challenge was based on the fact that I had previously denied as untimely plaintiff's Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge. The first statement of disqualification was stricken for failure to state grounds on its face.
- 5. Plaintiff has now filed plaintiff's second statement of disqualification. In this second statement of disqualification, plaintiff contends that I am biased and/or that there is an appearance of bias. In addition, plaintiff contends that I have prejudged this case. This second challenge is not verified. Rather the challenge is accompanied by the declaration of attorney Matthew J. Olson, who bases his assertion of bias upon his "information and belief." Although Mr. Olson and Macdonald/Fernandez were not counsel for plaintiff prior to the time they filed the notice of limited scope representation, counsel has attached as exhibits to his declaration reporter's transcripts from hearings held in this case on November 30, 2018, December 7, 2018, December 17, 2018, March 13, 2019, March 15, 2019, May 10, 2019 and July 19, 2019. In addition, plaintiff includes the court's order to show cause dated September 28, 2018, and the

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court's orders of April 29, 2019, June 19, 2019 and August 1, 2019. Plaintiff further includes various pleadings and news articles regarding the case. Although not stated in the declaration, in the memorandum of points and authorities, plaintiff alleges that the court's statements and orders issued during the proceedings indicate a bias and prejudgment of the issues.

- 6. I deny the claims made by plaintiff in this second statement of disqualification that I am biased or that any grounds for disqualification exist. I am not biased or prejudiced against or in favor of plaintiff Six4Three, LLC. I am not biased or prejudiced against or in favor of plaintiff's counsel. I am not biased or prejudiced against or in favor of defendant Facebook, Inc. I am not biased or prejudiced against or in favor of any party or attorney in this proceeding. I know of no reason why I cannot be fair and impartial in this case.
- 7. I deny the claims made by plaintiff that any of my statements, decisions or orders rendered during the proceedings have been the product of bias or have in any way indicated a pre-judgement of this case. My statements and rulings are set forth in the records and in the files therein, which are the best evidence thereof. To the extent the moving party's statement of those rulings are inconsistent therewith, they are denied.
- 8. All statements made by me and all actions taken by me in this proceeding, and in every proceeding over which I have presided, have been done in furtherance of what I believe were my judicial duties. My decisions have been based entirely upon the facts and information officially provided to me and my experience in handling similar cases.
- 9. All rulings made by me in this action have been based upon the facts and arguments officially presented to me and upon my understanding of the law. I am not predisposed to rule in any particular manner in the instant case
- 10. There are no facts or circumstances that I know of which would require my disqualification or recusal in this case.

11. I do not believe that my recusal would serve the interests of justice. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 15, 2019, in San Mateo County, California.

V. Raymond Swope,
Judge of the Superior Court

#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

I.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiff has filed its second statement of disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 directed to Judge V. Raymond Swope. Plaintiff filed its first statement of disqualification on July 12, 2019. That challenge was based on the fact that Judge Swope denied as untimely plaintiff's Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge. The first statement of disqualification was stricken by the court for failure to state grounds on its face.

In this second statement of disqualification, plaintiff contends that Judge Swope is actually biased and/or that there is an appearance of bias. In addition, plaintiff contends that Judge Swope has prejudged this case. This second challenge is not verified. Rather the challenge is accompanied by the declaration of attorney Matthew J. Olson who bases his assertion of bias upon his "information and belief." Although Mr. Olson and the law firm of Macdonald/Fernandez were not counsel for plaintiff prior to the time they filed the notice of limited scope representation, Mr. Olson has attached as exhibits to his declaration the reporter's transcripts from hearings held in this case on November 30, 2018, December 7, 2018, December 17, 2018, March 13, 2019, March 15, 2019, May 10, 2019 and July 19, 2019. In addition, the declaration includes as exhibits the court's order to show cause dated September 28, 2018, and the court's orders of April 29, 2019, June 19, 2019 and August 1, 2019. Plaintiff's counsel further attaches as exhibits various pleadings and news articles regarding the case. Although not stated in the declaration, in the memorandum of points and authorities, plaintiff takes issue with certain of the court's statements and rulings made during the proceedings about the proceedings. Plaintiff contends that the court's statements and rulings indicate a bias or prejudgment.

Plaintiff's challenge must be denied. The second statement of disqualification is untimely. Moreover, plaintiff's statement of disqualification fails to set forth facts which constitute grounds for the disqualification of Judge Swope. As the party seeking disqualification of the court, plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that Judge Swope is biased or that other grounds for disqualification exist. Here, plaintiff failed to meet its burden because the court's

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statements and rulings made during the proceedings about the proceedings do not constitute a valid basis for the disqualification of the court.

II.

### THE SECOND STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION IS UNTIMELY

"The statement shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification." (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1); People v. Sweet (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 392; Krebs v. Los Angeles R. Corp. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 549.) "A party seeking to disqualify a trial judge for cause must file a statement of disqualification at the 'earliest practical opportunity' after discovering facts constituting the grounds for the disqualification." (Eckert v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 262, 265.)

The court in *Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1337, stated: "The strict promptness requirement is not to be taken lightly, as a failure to comply constitutes forfeiture or an implied waiver of the disqualification. (Citation.)"

Here, the challenge is untimely. Plaintiff complains about the court's statements and rulings at hearings on November 30, 2018, December 7, 2018, December 17, 2018, March 13, 2019, March 15, 2019 and May 10, 2019; well before plaintiff filed the present challenge on August 6, 2019. Plaintiff's delay in bringing the present challenge constitutes an implied waiver of the disqualification. Accordingly, the present challenge must be denied.

III.

# THE STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION DOES NOT SET FORTH FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3(c)(1) requires the disqualification statement set forth "the facts constituting the grounds" for the disqualification of the judge. Mere allegations setting forth the conclusions of the declarant do not comply. (*Ephraim v. Superior Court* (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 578, 578-579; *Urias v. Harris Farms, Inc.* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 415, 426.)

Plaintiff, as the party seeking the disqualification of the court, has the burden of demonstrating that Judge Swope is biased or prejudiced; and, in the absence of proof, the presumption is that no bias or prejudice exists. (*Betz v. Pankow* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 926;

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see also, Estate of Buchman (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 81, 104.) Indeed, a party's belief as to a judge's bias and prejudice is irrelevant and not controlling in a motion to disqualify for cause, as the test applied is an objective one. (United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 104; Stanford University v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 403, 408 ("[T]he litigants' necessarily partisan views do not provide the applicable frame of reference.").) "Potential bias and prejudice must clearly be established. (Citation.)" (Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 724.)

Here, plaintiff has not clearly established that the court is biased or has prejudged any issue. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3(c)(1) states that "any party may file with the clerk a written verified statement objecting to the hearing or trial before the judge and setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification of the judge." Although section 170.3(c)(1) requires a verified challenge, a party may support the challenge with a declaration, if the declaration is executed under penalty of perjury and clearly sets forth the basis for the challenge. (Hollingsworth v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25-26.) In this case, the challenged is not verified or supported by a declaration which clearly sets forth the factual basis for the challenge. Further, plaintiff counsel's declaration is based upon his "information and belief." However, the declaration or verified statement filed in support of the disqualification is held to the same standard of admissibility as is oral testimony. (Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 551.) "[B]ias and prejudice are never implied and must be established by clear averments." (Woolley v. Superior Court (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 611, 626.) Verified statements which are based upon hearsay or upon information and belief, such as in this case, are not sufficient to support a judicial disqualification. (United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 106, n. 6; Higgins v. City of San Diego (1899) 126 Cal. 303. 313-314.)

Here, instead of supporting the statement of disqualification with a verification or declaration setting forth the factual basis for the present challenge, plaintiff has submitted numerous hearing transcripts, court orders and newspaper articles. Like in this case, in *In re Morelli* (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 819, 843–44, the court held that the statement of disqualification

may be stricken where it is based upon "conclusions; references to copious transcripts without citation to specific excerpts; allegations of facts not pertinent or appropriate to the issues to be determined in the hearing; material not legally indicative of bias or prejudice, such as judicial opinions expressed in the discharge of litigation and legal rulings; judicial reactions based on actual observance in participation in legal proceedings; and references to circumstances so inconsequential as to be no indication whatsoever of hostility and nonprobative of any bias or prejudice. (Citations.)"

Indeed, "[t]o show bias or prejudice...there must be declarations showing indications of personal bias or the existence of some fixed anticipatory prejudgment." (*In re the Marriage of Fenton* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 451, 457.)

Here, there are no facts set forth to show a personal bias against a party or party's attorney. There are no facts set forth to show a fixed anticipatory prejudgment.

Bias or prejudice consists of a "mental attitude or disposition of the judge towards a party to the litigation . . ." (Citation.) In order for the judge to be disqualified, the prejudice must be against a particular party ... and sufficient to impair the judge's impartiality so that it appears probable that a fair trial cannot be held. (Citations.)

(Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc. v. Ensher (1964) 225 Cal. App.2d 318, 322-323.)

As stated in *People v. Ford* (1914) 25 Cal.App. 388, 395:

It is not sufficient in a case of this kind, to allege in the affidavit simply that the defendant believes that he cannot have a fair and impartial trial, etc., but it must be made to appear by the affidavit or affidavits on file that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before the judge about to try the case, by reason of the bias and prejudice of such judge. (Citation.) The affidavit or affidavits must not only state facts, but the facts stated must establish to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the judge has a bias or prejudice that will in all probability prevent him from dealing fairly with the defendant.

As is clear from the reporter's transcripts attached to the declaration of plaintiff's counsel, no reasonable person would fairly entertain a doubt that Judge Swope would be fair and impartial in this case. The test for such a determination is an objective one: "whether a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." (*Briggs v. Superior Court* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 312, 319.)

The 'reasonable person' is not someone who is 'hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,' but rather is a 'well-informed, thoughtful observer.' (Citation.) '[T]he partisan litigant emotionally involved in the controversy underlying the lawsuit is not the *disinterested objective observer* whose doubts concerning the judge's impartiality provide the governing standard.' (Citations.)

(Wechsler v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 384, 391.)

Moreover, the statements and rulings of the court made during the proceedings do not support grounds for disqualification. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.2(b) states that it is not grounds for disqualification that a judge "has in any capacity expressed a view on a legal or factual issue presented in the proceeding." In fact, rulings and findings based upon evidence and argument officially presented can almost never constitute a valid basis for disqualification.

As stated in Liteky v. United States, supra, 510 U.S. 540, 555:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.

As stated in *McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.* (1916) 172 Cal. 6, findings based upon evidence and argument officially presented can almost never constitute a valid basis for disqualification. Erroneous rulings, even when numerous and continuous, are not grounds for bias or prejudice, nor are "judges' expressions of opinion uttered in what he conceives to be the discharge of his judicial duty." (*Ibid.*) A party's remedy for an erroneous ruling is not a motion to disqualify, but rather review by appeal or writ. (*Id.* at 11; *see also, Ryan v. Welte* (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 888, 893 ("[A] wrong opinion on the law of a case does not disqualify a judge, nor is it evidence of bias or prejudice.").) Otherwise, "no judge who is reversed by a higher court on any ruling or decision would ever be qualified to proceed further in the particular case." (*Ibid.*) The proper remedy is an appeal from the erroneous ruling. (*Ibid.*)

As stated in *Liteky*, 510 U.S. at 555:

[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. (Citation.) In and of themselves ... they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial source